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Abstract
I study the dynamics of voluntary local public good provision in a free-mobility envi-
ronment when agents differ substantially in the benefit they receive from the public good
provided within their community. I find that subjects move in response to both provision
and community composition but that the growth and stability of these communities are
dictated by movement costs and crowding. When the public good is congestible, such
that returns are lower for larger populations, communities are characterized by instability,
cyclical fluctuations in local provision, and a dynamic in which low demanders contin-
ually chase high demanders through locations. When congestion is eliminated, agents
with different preferences sometimes co-exist, but chronic, inefficient movement persists,
suggesting that instability is driven by intrinsic preferences for community composition,
as well as by sensitivity to congestion. While communities with high entry fees primarily
attract those with high public good returns, segregation is not sufficient for overcoming
free-riding.
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1 Introduction 
Achieving sufficient cooperation to allow community members to work together toward a 
common goal is essential for the functioning of most societies. In public goods and other 
collective action problems, individual incentives often diverge from the interests of the group as 
a whole. Since all members may consume the public good, regardless of whether they contribute 
to it, they have an incentive to underreport their true preferences and equilibrium behavior results 
in individual free-riding and a suboptimal allocation of the public good provided in the 
community. Efficient provision is even more difficult to achieve when residents have different 
preferences for public good consumption, since a community that cannot force its residents to 
reveal their true demand cannot require different contributions or behavior from those who 
would benefit most.  
Charles Tiebout (1956) addressed this problem with the insight that many of the public 
goods and services that we consume – education, police and fire service, libraries, roads, parks, 
and so forth – are provided by our local communities and that non-residents may be 
geographically excluded from consuming them. He proposed that residents who are able to move 
freely between local jurisdictions would enter the community that best satisfied their preferences 
for the public good along with other local non-economic features (Tiebout, 1956, p.418). By 
moving in response to differences in local communities, residents reveal their true preferences 
and an efficient public good allocation can be achieved at the local level. The fundamental 
premise of Tiebout’s argument has implications far beyond local public finance and public good 
provision and Tiebout's proposal is routinely invoked across disciplines to capture the idea that if 
we dislike our current situation we can move elsewhere – somewhere better, where the people 
and policies better suit our preferences, and the outcomes are more to our liking. 
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This paper uses laboratory experiments to study the dynamics of local community 
formation, development, and stability when agents receive very different returns from the public 
good. I conduct simple linear public goods experiments in a free-mobility environment to gain 
insight into the basic underlying processes of movement, community formation, and the 
phenomenon of one type of agent chasing another. These experiments incorporate two 
fundamental features of Tiebout’s framework: that public goods are spatially excludable and may 
be consumed only by local residents, and that residents are both fully mobile and fully informed 
of the differences between locations. Within this setting, I induce heterogeneous preferences for 
the public good and study the dynamics of movement and voluntary local public good provision. 
To the best of my knowledge, this paper represents the first experimental study of the importance 
of preference heterogeneity in movement dynamics. 
These experiments also consider the importance of entry fees and congestion for 
community stability and address the following questions: 1) Is movement driven by agents’ 
preferences for the public good? 2) Are instability and cyclical movement patterns caused 
primarily by congestion? and 3) Can entry fees facilitate sorting and local cooperation? 
I find that communities experience cyclical fluctuations in local public good provision, 
along with perpetual movement and instability. There is a clear pattern of chasing in which those 
who benefit most from the public good (“High Types”) enter previously unoccupied locations at 
an immediate cost to themselves and make high contributions to the public good. Once their 
community becomes competitive, they are followed in turn by those with low returns (“Low 
Types”), provision deteriorates, and the cycle restarts once again.  
This paper also analyzes the extent to which these dynamics are driven by payoff 
congestion, by directly comparing experimental sessions with a congestible public good to 
sessions with a pure public good. A public good is congestible if it is rivalrous: the presence of 
more residents diminishes the benefit which each may obtain. Local entry fees are relatively 
higher for those who benefit very little from the public good and such fees can therefore serve as 
a mechanism that coordinates separation by type and may allow agents to avoid congestion. In 
the absence of congestion, the most efficient outcome occurs when the population pools its 
resources into a single community and, in this case, there is no set of residents who may increase 
their payoffs by collectively relocating. Though movement is less frequent in sessions without 
congestion, the chasing dynamic and community instability persist. This suggests that movement 
is partially driven by an intrinsic unwillingness to be around those who do not contribute to the 
community, rather than purely by payoff congestion. 
Finally, I find that differences in local entry fees can facilitate the High Types’ 
coordinated avoidance of the Low Types. Locations associated with high fees are entered almost 
exclusively by High Types and experience high contributions. However, even when High Types 
segregate, provision is not sustained and these communities are no more stable than those with 
low entry fees.  
– 
Experimental studies have consistently shown that voluntary contributions in fixed-
group, linear public goods games begin midway between optimal and one-­‐shot equilibrium levels 
but decline with repetition, typically approaching the theoretical equilibrium unless supported by 
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institutions, such as sanctions or taxes for those who contribute too little (Ledyard, 1995; 
Ostrom, 2000). 
However, in our society it is rare that we find ourselves assigned to a fixed community. 
We nearly always enter such groups voluntarily, with some expectations of the group outcome 
based on the local history or norms, and with the understanding that we can move elsewhere 
should we disapprove of the behavior of our neighbors. Thus a more practical approach is to 
study the public goods problem at the local level, where association is voluntary and movement 
is possible. 
Despite the abundance of applications, only recently has experimental research jointly 
considered voluntary public goods contributions and endogenous group formation. The results 
thus far suggest that mobility in itself is not sufficient to solve the public goods problem without 
the implementation of formal boundary rules that restrict group entry and that if individuals have 
complete freedom to move between groups then free-riders will continuously chase contributors 
between societies.  
Ehrhart and Keser (1999), the first to conduct such experiments, study a congestible 
linear public goods game. They find a group-level dynamic in which groups with high 
contributions grow, contributions in large groups decline, and groups with declining 
contributions shrink, and an individual-level correlation suggesting that higher contributors exit 
larger groups in favor of smaller ones. A pair of studies compared treatments in which subjects 
can freely move between groups, can enter only with their new group’s consent, or can exit only 
with their former group’s consent (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2008/2009). They find that subjects 
often vote to deny entry or approve exit, even in the pure public good treatment when groups 
benefit from having more members, and so, while restricted entry serves to increase 
contributions, earnings are lower for cooperators when the public good is pure.  
Several other experimental studies have found that high contributions can be sustained in 
voluntary contribution public goods games when subjects are provided with a  mechanism to 
build their groups and control membership composition (Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005; 
Weber, 2006; Charness and Yang, 2010). 
There is evidence that declining contributions may be explained by conditional 
cooperation – the willingness of subjects to cooperate only if their partners do as well – and 
approximately half of experimental subjects decrease their contributions if their group members 
contribute less (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001). Faced only with the choice of how much 
to contribute, subjects locked into fixed groups have no other means of retaliation against free-
riders and quickly learn to cease attempts at cooperation. Several experimental studies have 
tested conditional cooperation by sorting subjects based on the propensity for cooperation that 
they exhibit in earlier periods or games, and nearly all find that contribution is sustained at a 
higher level when cooperators only ever encounter other cooperators (Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, 
and McCabe, 2007; Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith, 2007; Gunnthorsdottir, Vragov, McCabe, and 
Seifert, 2008; Yang, Yu, and Yue, 2007; Cabrera, Fatas, Lacomba, and Neugebauer, 2009; 
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Burlando and Guala, 2005; Ones and Putterman, 2007; Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Gächter 
and Thöni, 2005).1 
Experiments allowing subjects to buy entry into separate games designed to be more 
attractive to cooperators typically find moderate but incomplete sorting (Bohnet and Kübler, 
2005; Brekke, Hauge, Lind, and Nyborg, 2008). When subjects may “vote with their feet” for 
local institutions and choose between groups with or without punishment mechanisms, they 
initially separate, with only the most cooperative joining the punishment community. However, 
the entire population eventually gathers in the community with punishment and achieves high 
levels of efficiency (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, 2006; Dorj, 2008).  
Yet many important aspects of this problem remain unexplored. In addition to having 
different preferences for contributing or free-riding, as these studies suggest, individuals in a 
society typically obtain varying benefits from public good consumption. These differences are at 
the core of the preference revelation problem and the inability of a central government to 
efficiently provide public goods. While there have been several fixed-group public goods 
experiments considering heterogeneous preferences, there has not been any experimental work 
which incorporates such differences into the local public goods framework, and, to my 
knowledge, this is the first experimental study on the dynamics of group formation when agents 
have heterogeneous preferences. 
This paper extends the previous experimental local public good research in several ways. 
First, I introduce two different types of agents: those who benefit greatly from the public good, 
but may be highly sensitive to congestion, and those who receive very low returns from the 
public good but are indifferent to the presence of others. Second, these experiments vary the cost 
of moving, with some locations having entry fees triple that of the others. In addition, I conduct 
sessions with more than twice the number of periods of the previous local public good studies to 
better analyze group stability and long-run dynamics. Finally, I conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of the importance of payoff congestion in public good returns for movement dynamics 
and stability, by comparing sessions in which the public good is pure (non-rivalrous) with 
sessions in which the public good is congestible.   
 
2 The Setting 
The experiments in this paper consider a local, linear public good that is provided by 
voluntary contributions from community members. There are nine agents in the population and 
six available locations. In each period, agents make the dual choice regarding where to locate 
and how much to contribute to their community once they are there. Each agent belongs to 
exactly one community in each period, and consumes only the public good provided within his 
location (there no spillovers).  
All agents have the same endowment of 25 units each and differ only in their marginal 
per-capita return (MPCR), which is the increase in profits that the agent receives from someone 
in his community contributing an additional unit to the public good. Agents whose payoffs are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The one exception is Ockenfels and Weimann (1999), which uses the very low MPCR of 0.33, a value at which 
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sensitive to congestion experience declining MPCR over the number of members in their 
community. 
Let Lit be the location that agent i chooses in period t. In each period, each agent i 
receives a payoff that depends on his personal contribution, ci, the total contributions made at his 
location, the total number of members at his location, n(Lit ), and any entry fees he may have 
incurred by selecting a different location than in the previous period, f(Lit).  
 
In each period t, agent i’s payoff is equal to: 
 
€ 
π t
i = 25 − cti + MPCRi(n(Lti )) * ctj
j |Ltj =Lti
∑ − f (Lti ) *1Lti ≠Lt−1i
                   (1) 
Where MPCR is equal to: 
Congestible Public Good Sessions:   Pure Public Good Sessions: 
Low Types: MPCR = 0.15    Low Types: MPCR = 0.15   
High Types: MPCR = 1 - 0.08 (n-1)   High Types: MPCR = 0.8 if n>1 
                  = 1 if n=1 
Entry fees are the same for all agents and vary by location entered: three of the six 
locations have an entry fee of 5 units and the other three locations have an entry fee of 15 units. 
In each population of nine agents, there are five “High Types” whose MPCR is very high, such 
that they greatly benefit from local public good provision. In the congestible public good 
sessions, the MPCR of the High Types declines sharply with the number of other members in 
their community, thus making them very sensitive to the presence of free-riders. In the pure 
public good sessions, their MPCR remains high regardless of the community size. In both pure 
public good and congestible public good sessions, the MPCR is set at 1 when a High Type is in a 
community by himself, thus ensuring that between-condition differences are not driven by 
signaling costs. The remaining four agents in the population are “Low Types” who have an 
extremely low marginal per-capita return, which is constant across the number of members. 
When the public good is congestible, the most efficient outcome occurs when all High 
Types and two Low Types locate within a single location and contribute their entire endowment 
of 25 units each, while avoiding the other two Low Types who locate elsewhere and contribute 
nothing. When the public good is pure, the most efficient outcome has all High Types and Low 
Types in a single location, contributing their full endowments.  
Previous experimental and theoretical work can provide several baseline hypotheses in 
this environment. One assumption of the dynamic group formation literature is that agents 
myopically best respond to the previous partition (for instance, Arnold and Wooders, 2002). This 
assumption implies that agents move if and only if there is another location where, in the 
previous period, they would have done better than in their own and this magnitude is greater than 
that location’s entry fee. But since myopic best responders should also never contribute, the 
public good will not be provided in any location, and so no one will ever move. This assumption 
provides us with the baseline prediction that neither movement nor contribution will occur.  
However, voluntary contributions experiments tell us that subjects do often contribute but 
that very low MPCRs tend to suppress contributions. The first hypothesis is that the High Types 
will make higher contributions. 
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Hypothesis 1: High Types contribute more than Low Types. 
For High Types in the congestible public good sessions, for whom MPCR declines over 
the number of members, this hypothesis is also extended to community size: subjects who 
experience payoff congestion should be less willing to contribute in large communities. 
However, communities may also experience behavioral congestion: collective action problems 
would cause both types of agents, in both conditions, to contribute less in larger communities. 
Alternatively, if types are more likely to be with other subjects of the same type, conditional 
cooperation implies that High Types may contribute less in larger communities in both 
treatments, while Low Types contribute more in larger communities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Contributions depend on community size: a) Payoff Congestion: High Types’ 
contributions decline over community size in congestion sessions; b) Behavioral Congestion: 
Both types’ contributions decline over community size in both pure and congestion sessions. 
With the stipulation that some contributions will be made, the assumption that agents 
myopically best respond to the previous partition in their movement decisions provides the 
hypothesis that agents are responsive to differences in local provision levels and abandon vastly 
inferior communities. Specifically, agent i will move from community h to community g in 
period t if and only if: 
€ 
ct−1j
j |Lt−1j = g
∑ − MPCR
i(n(g))
MPCRi(n(h) +1) * ct−1
j
j |Lt−1j = h
∑ > f (g)MPCRi(n(h) +1) − ct
i         (2) 
which, when MPCR is constant over community size, reduces to: 
€ 
ct−1j
j |Lt−1j = g
∑ − ct−1j
j |Lt−1j = h
∑ > f (g)MPCRi − ct
i                     (3) 
The third hypothesis is that relatively poorly performing communities cannot persist. 
Hypothesis 3: There will exist multiple, stable, populated communities only if they are 
sufficiently similar. 
Since High Types receive greater returns from the public good, the entry fees are 
relatively lower for them, and they should therefore be more responsive to slight differences in 
local provision and more prone to movement. The early flight of those most sensitive to 
deterioration in quality is a familiar phenomenon – going back to Albert O. Hirschman (1970)’s 
treatise on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty – and has been documented in a range of experiments in 
which the option to exit is available (Miller and Holmes, 1975; Yamagishi, 1988; Fujiyama et al, 
2005; Ehrhart and Keser, 1999). Thus the fourth hypothesis is that High Types will be more 
responsive to differences in public good provision.  
 
Hypothesis 4: High Types have a lower threshold for movement, such that they move with 
greater frequency and their exit from underperforming communities precedes the exit of Low 
Types.  
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Unless High Type contribution is very high, the difference in relative magnitude of entry 
fees may promote separation of types and support (conditional) cooperation. Since the Low 
Types receive little benefit from the public good, they should be willing to pay the cost of 
locating near the High Types only if they expect contributions to be far greater in that location 
than in their own. A partition of agents is Nash stable if there is no agent who would increase his 
payoff by unilaterally relocating. A partition of agents is strong Nash stable if there is no set of 
agents that could increase their payoffs by collectively relocating. When the entry fees are high 
enough relative to the High Type provision levels, the Low Types will be segregated from the 
High Types in a strong Nash stable partition. Specifically, by equation (3), if the High Types are 
segregated from the Low Types in a community with a low (high) entry fee, this partition will be 
stable if the High Types collectively contribute no more than 33 (100) units more than the Low 
Types. On the other hand, if the High Type contributions are very high, Low Types will wish to 
enter the community with the High Types and a community containing the entire population will 
be Nash stable. When the public good is congestible, no strong Nash stable partition exists, as 
the High Types would always prefer to collectively exit provided they are contributing more per 
person than the Low Types. 
 
Hypothesis 5: When the public good is congestible, the relative differences in entry fees may 
promote sorting and separation by type.  
If, on the other hand, movement is prevalent when the public good is congestible, then 
the dynamics when the local public good is pure are critical to understanding what is driving this 
pattern. When the High Types do not experience payoff congestion, a single populated 
community is both efficient and strong Nash stable. The direct comparison of the congestible and 
pure public good treatments provides insight into the motivations of those who move into a 
previously empty location at an immediate cost to themselves, and may lead to more general 
inferences regarding the role of mobility in public goods and other social dilemma games. Table 
1 summarizes these motivations and implications. 
 
Movement and Chasing in 
Congestion Sessions 
Driven By 
Predicted Dynamic in 
Pure Sessions 
Implications 
Benefit to some of 
forming smaller 
communities 
Single community with 
standard decline 
Little difference from 
fixed group experiments 
Feature of payoff function 
which punished agents for 
contributing in large 
communities 
Single community with 
sustained contributions 
Existence of other 
locations serve as a threat 
which sustains higher 
contributions 
Attempt to restart cycle Single community 
during most periods with 
movement and 
contribution reset 
Movement is effective in 
restarting the public goods 
game 
Resentment Chasing similar to 
congestible public good 
Cycling result is robust 
Table 1: Separating motivations for the chasing dynamic 
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3 Experimental Design 
Experiments were conducted using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 
in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science at the California Institute of 
Technology and in the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory at the Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government. Nine subjects participated in each session, and were paid based on their 
performance in the game. There were thirteen sessions in total: six in which the public good was 
pure (non-rivalrous) and seven in which the public good was congestible.  
In the initial period of each session, the subjects were randomly assigned to three 
communities of three members each and chose how to allocate their endowment between private 
and public consumption. In subsequent periods, there were three additional locations, for a total 
of six available locations, and the participants made their decisions in two stages.  
First, the subjects chose whether to stay in their current location or to move to a different 
location for a fee. While making this choice, they were able to observe the total contributions and 
number of community members in all locations, as well as their own contributions and returns, in 
each of the previous three periods. Movement into one of the three original locations incurred a 
low fee (5 units: equivalent to 20% of their per-period endowment) while movement into one of 
the other three locations incurred a much higher fee (15 units: 60% of their endowment). Entry 
fees were subtracted from their payoffs at the end of the period and thus did not restrict 
contributions.  
Once they made their location decisions, the subjects then observed how many others 
were in their chosen location and made a contribution to that community’s public good. Subjects 
were able to observe only the number of people and the total contributions in the locations, and 
did not receive any information regarding the location of specific subjects or individual 
contribution levels.  
 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
The following results are reported for seven sessions with congestion (one which lasted 
30 periods, one which lasted 27 periods, and four which lasted 65 periods) and six sessions 
without congestion (one which lasted 65 periods and five which lasted 80 periods). The results 
are displayed for both types of sessions. 
 
4.1. Efficiency and Overall Dynamics: Congestible vs. Pure Public Goods 
 
Congestible Public Good  
Result 1.1: Locations experience cyclical patterns of boom and bust in local provision levels.  
Local public good provision in the congestible public good sessions (CPG) is 
characterized by cyclical patterns of boom and bust. Provision peaks shortly after community 
formation and declines steadily over time. Figure 1 shows the average provision level over the 
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life of a community. The total contributions made within a community declines over the time 
that it is continuously populated by at least two members. 
      
Figure 1: The total contributions made in a community over the number of periods that it has been continuously 
populated by at least two members 
 
Result 1.2: When the public good is congestible, Low Types chase the High Types.  
 
Movement is frequent – occurring in over three quarters of all periods – and communities 
are highly unstable. There is a clear dynamic in which Low Types continually chase the High 
Types, a pattern that never slows or ceases over the 65-period experiment. High Types enter 
previously empty locations at an immediate cost to themselves and contribute once they are 
there. They are then joined by fellow High Types and provision increases. The Low Types 
follow as soon as this new community surpasses their own. Provision levels then decline and the 
High Types exit once again. Table 2 presents OLS regressions of the number of High Types and 
Low Types in a community on the previous community composition and contribution levels. A 
more detailed analysis of the differences in moving patterns for the two types follows in the next 
section. 
  
Dependent Variable: # Highst 
          (1)                     (2) 
# Lowst 
          (1)                     (2) 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
# Highst-1 .67* 
(<0.001) 
.67* 
(<0.001) 
.01 
(0.34) 
-.011 
(0.37) 
# Lowst-1 -.11* 
(<0.001) 
-.09* 
(<0.001) 
.7797* 
(<0.001) 
.82* 
(<0.001) 
Total Contributionst-1 .021* 
(<0.001) 
.02* 
(<0.001) 
.012* 
(<0.001) 
.010* 
(<0.001) 
# Highst-1 - # Highst-2 – .06* 
(0.006) 
– .163* 
(<0.001) 
Intercept .11* 
(<0.001) 
.11* 
(<0.001) 
-.00008 
(0.995) 
.01 
(0.32) 
R2 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.83 
Observations 2250 2250 2250 2250 
Table 2: Community composition dynamics: regressions of the numbers of High and Low Types in a location on the 
previous characteristics of the location 
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Pure Public Good 
When the High Types are not sensitive to congestion, instability and perpetual movement 
are reduced, but not eliminated. This suggests that resentment, or unwillingness to be around 
free-riders, is a robust phenomenon, and not purely a feature of payoff congestion.  
 
Result 1.3: Approximately 42% of the movement is driven by congestion. 
Though all subjects are weakly better off being in larger communities when the public 
good is pure, subjects do exit large communities in favor of smaller ones. Subjects move in 
18.35% of opportunities in CPG sessions and in 10.8% of opportunities in pure public good 
(PPG) sessions. However, there is considerable variation in the population dynamics between 
sessions when the public good is pure: in two sessions subjects move more than 18% of the time 
(equivalent to the congestion sessions) while in other sessions they move as infrequently as 1% 
of all opportunities.  
 
Result 1.4: In some PPG sessions, subjects co-exist in a single group for most periods, while in 
the others, the dynamics strongly resemble those in the CPG sessions. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of populated locations per period. While 
there are typically three communities in existence when the public good is congestible, subjects 
are most frequently in a single community when the public good is pure. However, this varies 
starkly across sessions. In the three sessions with the least movement, all subjects are together in 
72.3%, 73.8%, and 93.8% of periods respectively, while in the other three sessions subjects are 
together only 10%, 26.3%, and 36.3% of periods. In these latter sessions, population and 
contribution dynamics appear very similar to those in the congestible public good sessions. 
 
Figure 2: The number of populated communities per period in pure and congestible sessions 
 
At the beginning of each session, subjects typically attempt to create one all-inclusive 
community, and most participants move into the same location by the fifth or sixth period. In the 
CPG sessions, contributions decline, this community is soon deserted, and after the fifteenth 
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period there are typically at least three populated communities in any period. Occasional 
renewed attempts to establish larger communities also quickly disintegrate. In PPG sessions not 
characterized by frequent movement, the all-inclusive community endures over most periods, 
and exit is occasional and temporary.  
Community population tends to fluctuate in waves, rather than sudden coordinated 
movements, and those who move to previously empty locations tend to exit on their own. 
Whether the subjects’ exit is temporary and they will soon rejoin the larger community, or others 
instead join them in defection, depends on the relative provision levels offered in the old and 
new communities – though less is needed to entice High Types to follow when the public good is 
congestible.  
In sessions characterized by frequent movement, communities with a population of one 
are typically joined by others. On the other hand, in sessions in which the entire population is 
most often together, single member communities are typically not entered by others, and fade 
from existence when the lone member returns to the large community. This demonstrates that 
movement into previously empty locations in these non-chasing sessions is most commonly 
temporary, and again suggests that the PPG sessions characterized by frequent movement are 
identical to the CPG sessions. Table 3 shows the number of singleton communities, and how 
often the community is either eventually joined by others or eventually abandoned by the single 
member.  
 
 Congestion Pure; Chasing 
Sessions 
Pure; Coexistence 
Sessions 
 
% of Populated Communities 
That Are Singleton Communities 
33%  31.5%  13.2%  
Persist to Next Period: 67.8% 70% 65% 
End with Defection (community 
disappears): 
17.2% 16.67% 61.57% 
End With Invasion (community 
grows): 
82.8% 83.33% 38.46% 
Table 3: The frequency of singleton communities and whether the singleton community ends with the member 
exiting (defection) or others joining (invasion) 
 
Result 1.5: Efficiency is 18% above the Nash Equilibrium in the CPG sessions and 21% in the 
PPG sessions.  
While eliminating sensitivity to congestion from the payoff function does increase 
stability, efficiency increases only slightly. 
 
 
4.2. Movement and Contribution Patterns are Shaped by the Agents’ Preferences for the  
Public Good 
 
Result 2.1: High Types contribute; Low Types do not 
There is a pronounced difference in the behavior of the two types. Though contributing 
nothing is the dominant myopic strategy for both, High Types contribute much more, consistent 
	   12	  
with previous results showing that MPCR affects contributions.2 Differences in MPCR explain 
approximately one third of the variation in contributions when the public good is congestible and 
one fifth of the variation in the pure public good sessions (in which such differences are 
primarily between-subjects). There are no differences in average contributions between the pure 
public good and congestible public good sessions.  
 
Result 2.2: Contributions of High Types are sustained, while contributions of Low Types 
decline. 
Contributions of High Types do not significantly decrease over time. However, the 
contributions of Low Types do decline over the course of the session and, in the congestion 
sessions, approach zero.3  
Figure 3 shows the average contribution over time for each type. By the end of the CPG 
sessions, all but a lone Low Type have learned to never contribute more than five units, while 
many High Types contribute greater amounts toward the end than they had at the beginning. This 
may suggest that initial contributions reflect individuals’ intrinsic preferences for cooperation 
(which may be entirely or partially driven by poor comprehension or unfamiliarity with the game 
form), and that they adjust over time as they learn to be more responsive to their returns and to 
the free-mobility environment. Approximately half of all High Types in the CPG sessions 
increase their contributions from the first period to the end of the session while only one Low 
Type does so. 
  
    Figure 3a: Congestible Public Good                          Figure 3b: Pure Public Good 
 
When the public good is pure, the divergence in behavior between types is less stark: 
some Low Types continue their contributions to the end of the session, while most High Types 
moderately reduce their contributions. This suggests that subjects are more likely to learn and 
contribute according to their type during the congestion sessions than those in which the public 
good is pure. However, if we look only at communities in which all subjects are not together, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The average contribution per period is 10.9 for High Types and 3.2 for Low Types. This difference is significant at 
less than the .01 level. In addition, differences in contributions between types are not significant when controlling 
for MPCR.   
3 The decrease in contribution over time is significant for Low Types at p<.001 with fixed effects in both the CPG 
and PPG sessions. 
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contributions are very similar to the CPG sessions for both types, suggesting that when there is 
frequent movement, contributions over time do not depend on payoff congestion. There is also 
evidence of a kind of conditional cooperation: when all subjects are together in stable 
communities, the behavior of the two types is more similar, with the Highs contributing less and 
the Lows contributing more.  
 
Result 2.3: High Type contributions decline over community size even in the absence of 
congestion in their payoff functions. 
 
As predicted, the contributions of High Types decline over community size in the CPG 
sessions, as MPCR declines as well. However, High Type contributions are also lower in larger 
communities in the PPG sessions, when MPCR is constant. Thus there is evidence of behavioral 
congestion, which may contribute to movement from larger communities even when the public 
good is not congestible: if subjects are aware that large communities experience collective action 
problems, their movement away from larger communities in the pure public good sessions may 
also be partially payoff-driven. For Low Types, contributions increase slightly over community 
size.4 Figure 4 shows the average contributions of each type over community size. 
  
      Figure 4a: Congestible Public Good                         Figure 4b: Pure Public Good 
 
Similarly, if we look at the probability of contributing any non-zero amount over 
community size, there also is a slight decline in the High Types’ likelihood of contributing in 
both pure and congestible public good sessions, and a slight increase in the Low Types 
likelihood of contributing.   
 
Result 2.4: High Types move more often than Low Types when the public good is congestible. 
Movement is less common and High Types do not move significantly more often when the 
public good is pure.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Low Type contributions are weakly positively correlated with community size in both the congestion and pure 
public good sessions, and both are significant at the .01 level. High Type contributions are negatively correlated 
with community size in both types of sessions (significant at the .01 level for each), with the magnitude of the effect 
approximately double in the congestion sessions.	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When the public good is congestible, High Types move in 21.2% of all opportunities 
while Low Types move in 13.4% of opportunities. When the public good is pure, High Types 
move in 11% of opportunities and Low Types move in 10.4% of opportunities.5  
 
Result 2.5: High Types move into smaller communities and are also more likely to found 
communities by moving into previously empty locations.  
A founder is an individual who moves into a previously empty location. Forty-two of the 
fifty-nine founders in the pure public good sessions are High Types and seventy of the seventy-
eight founders are High Types in the congestion sessions. High Types are significantly more 
likely to found communities, even after controlling for their more frequent movement, but this 
difference is less pronounced when the public good is pure.6  
 
4.3. Within-Type Differences 
 
While there is significant difference in the average contributions of the two preference 
types, there is also considerable variation within types. In particular, there is greater variation in 
the contributions of the High Types – while most Low Types do not contribute, there are both 
contributors and free-riders among the High Types. Moreover, when subtypes are classified by 
contribution level, the differences in contribution among the High Types are strongly associated 
with differences in movement patterns in the congestible public good sessions. 
 
Result 3.1: In the congestion sessions, the High Types who contribute more also move into 
smaller communities and repeatedly found new communities.  
 
When the public good is congestible, there is a very strong negative relation between the 
size of communities that High Types join and their average contributions.7 Figure 5 presents the 
average contribution of each subject plotted against the average size of the communities he 
joined, along with linear fits for each type. There is no such across-subject association between 
size of communities entered and contributions when the public good is not congestible. 
However, once again, the PPG sessions with frequent movement are similar to the CPG sessions. 
In addition, the Low Types who found communities: 1) contribute more than other Low 
Types (both in the period that they found8 and overall9) but less than High Type founders10; and 
2) tend to exit communities of similar size as those communities exited by High Type founders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The difference between types in the CPG sessions is significant at p=.01, as is the difference between CPG and 
PPG sessions. 
6	  Between subjects, High Types are significantly more likely to found new communities with p=.03 in CPG and p = 
.08 in PPG.  
7 Removing contributions to singleton communities – which is a costless signal for High Types – from the average 
does not alter this result. 
8 7.29 vs. 3.5 
9 6.04 vs. 3.5 
10 High Type founders contribute 22 units on average they start a new community, while Low Types contribute 
7.29.  
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Figure 5: The average personal contribution vs. average size of community joined for each subject in the congestible 
public good sessions 
 
 
4.4. Communities Entered vs. Communities Exited  
 
Figure 6 presents the sizes and provision levels of the communities entered and exited, 
for each preference type and each condition. The darker gray bars show the average population 
size and total contributions in the community exited (not including themselves or their own 
contributions) and the lighter gray bars show the average population size and total contributions 
in the community entered (based on the outcomes in the previous period, which is the 
information on which they made their movement decision). 
High Types tend to exit very large communities in favor of smaller ones, while Low 
Types exit smaller communities in favor of slightly larger ones.11  
 
  
Figure 6: Features of communities entered and exited  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This difference is significant at the p =0.01 for High Types and significant for Low Types only in PPG sessions at 
p=0.05. 
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Result 4.1: High Types have a much lower threshold for exit than Low Types and, though in 
similarly sized communities, High Types experience higher provision levels than Low Types.  
While both High Types and Low Types tend to exit communities where the others are 
contributing little in favor of communities with much higher provision levels, the average 
provision in the community entered is much greater for the Low Types.12 This suggests that entry 
fees do deter Low Types from moving into higher performing communities unless these 
communities offer substantially greater provision and that, despite the frequency of movement, 
some short-term sorting occurs.  
  
Result 4.2: In the absence of congestion, exit is used as a threat that is typically associated with 
an increase in contributions.  
As discussed in section 4.1, subjects tend to exit the all-inclusive community only 
temporarily in the PPG sessions. This process of exit and re-entry is associated with a spike in 
contributions in this community. The average community provision level is 50.4 in the final 
period before the all-inclusive community breaks up and is 74.8 in the first period in which it has 
been re-formed.13  
If a community founder offers a provision level that rivals that in the original community, 
exit becomes not just a temporary threat that increases cooperation, but instead sets off a cascade 
of movement to a new location. This, however, can only occur if contributions in the original 
community have deteriorated dramatically – so that one subject’s contribution rivals that of eight 
– or if a subject founds another community before the others have fully coordinated on a single 
other location. The significant between-session differences appear to be driven both by the 
willingness of some subjects to follow a community founder even when the payoffs in their 
current community are higher and by the willingness of some subjects to continue founding 
communities before the other communities have stabilized.   
 
 
 
4.5. Entry Fees  
 
Locations with differing entry fees can facilitate coordinated congestion avoidance. Since 
Low Types receive only a 15% return from the public good, myopic best responders should 
move into a low entry fee community only if the difference in expected contributions between 
the new community and their current community is greater than 33. However, when the cost of 
entering is three times as great, the difference in contribution must be greater than 100 units for 
the Low Types to recoup the entry fee. 
 
Result 5.1: In CPG sessions, high entry fee locations are entered almost exclusively by High 
Types and both average and total provision levels are much higher there.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This difference is significant at p<0.001. 
13 This difference is significant at p=0.01. 
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High Types account for 85% of the movement into the high entry fee locations. 
Contributions in these communities are more than double contributions in the low entry fee 
locations and total provision is also significantly higher. Figure 7 shows the total contributions 
and average contributions in low entry fee and high entry fee locations. However, these 
communities are no more stable than the low entry fee communities and neither their population 
nor provision levels are sustained for any longer. Thus even when the High Types are able to 
successfully coordinate and separate, provision levels cannot be maintained and the free-riding 
and chronic relocation problems persist.    
 
Result 5.2: In the PPG sessions, high entry fee locations are entered less frequently. The Low 
Types are just as likely to enter as are the High Types and, while average contributions are 
slightly higher in the high entry fee locations, total provision levels are lower. 
While subjects are in high entry fee locations approximately 11% of the time in the CPG 
sessions, they are in these locations only 6.8% of the time when the public good is pure. Though 
average contributions in PPG sessions are higher in the high entry fee locations, the average 
population is less than half that in other communities, and so the total provision levels do not 
rival those in the low entry fee locations. 
 
Figure 7: Per-capita contributions and local provision by entry fee  
 
 
 
4.6. Agents Move in Response to Public Good Provision  
 
Finally, I analyze the extent to which movement is influenced by local public good 
provision, for each of the two types of agents. 
While the voluntary contribution mechanism differs from the environment considered by 
Tiebout and the incentives for location choice are very different in this game, movement in 
response to variation in local provision history does provide support for Tiebout’s fundamental 
premise. In this voluntary contribution environment, Hypothesis 3 says that a partition of agents 
is stable only if provision is sufficiently similar in all populated locations. The results strongly 
affirm both of these generalized predictions.  
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Result 6.1: Subjects are most frequently in the community with the highest provision level and 
typically move if there is a community with vastly higher public good provision than in their 
own.  
Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution of how frequently a subject is in a community 
in which provision levels vary greatly from those in the highest community. The horizontal axis 
shows the discrepancy between the contributions in the subject’s location and those in the 
location with the highest total contributions.  
 
Figure 8:  Likelihood that subjects are in a community with inferior provision levels 
 
The likelihood that subjects are in an inferior community depends on the magnitude of 
the difference in provision levels, with subjects in the community with the highest total provision 
53% of the time in the congestion sessions and 80% of the time in the no congestion sessions.  
This lends support to the hypothesis that multiple populated communities can persist only 
if they offer similar provision levels, though this is less true for both High and Low Types when 
the High Types experience congestion. Probit analysis suggests that the probability of exiting a 
community is driven by the difference between provision in one’s own community and in the 
community with the highest provision. Additionally, the High Types are both more likely to exit 
a poorly performing community and more likely to be in the community with the highest 
provision level than the Low Type subjects, suggesting that the entry fees do generate some 
sorting.  
 
Result 6.2: Given that agents move, they typically select the community that performed best in 
the previous period, based on either total or per-capita contribution levels, or the community 
which would have given them the highest payoff in the previous period.  
 
Figure 9 shows the likelihood that the subjects make the “best” location choice – given 
that the subject moves – by entering the community with the highest average or total 
contributions, entering the community in which they would have received the highest payoff had 
they been in that community making the same contribution in the previous period, or entering a 
community satisfying at least one of these three criteria. These graphs exclude the movement of 
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subjects into previously empty locations, as such moves are never myopic best responses and 
those who frequently take such action exhibit other strategic differences. 
The counterfactual tends to best explain which community the subject enters in nearly all 
of the conditions, though there is considerable overlap.14 While Low Types are just as likely to 
choose their new community based on total contributions or average contributions, High Types 
are more attracted to communities with greater per-capita contributions – even when there is no 
congestion in their payoffs.15 Subjects select the previously best performing community with a 
frequency significantly greater than if they were choosing at random or cycling between the three 
low entry fee communities.16  However, neither are they fully myopically best responding to the 
previous state. 
 
   
   Figure 9a: Congestible Public Good                         Figure 9b: Pure Public Good  
 
The previous result suggests that subjects who move tend to select the community in 
which they would have done the best in the previous period, but the question remains whether 
such movement is, in fact, profitable. Though it is impossible to construct a perfect 
counterfactual for their continuation payoffs had they not moved, this question may be analyzed 
through a couple of other approaches. 
First, fixed effects regressions show that moves are associated with higher public good 
returns in the subsequent period, though this difference is not great enough to immediately 
recoup the entry fees. While the subjects better their location, movement is associated with an 
average one-period loss of 4 units in the CPG sessions and 2.4 units in the PPG sessions. These 
results are summarized in Table 4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The difference is slight and typically not significant. The one condition that it does not best explain is the 
movement of High Types when there is no congestion. This suggests that the movement we see in the congestion 
sessions of High Types exiting larger communities is motivated not only by payoff congestion.  
 
15 These likelihoods are identical for Low Types in the PPG and CPG conditions. High Types are more likely to 
enter the community with the highest average contributions than they are to enter the community with the highest 
total contributions and this difference is significant at the p<.001 level in both conditions.  
16 All p<.001 
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Earnings Congestible 
 
Pure 
 
   
Move -3.9* 
(p<.001) 
-2.39*       
(p=.05)        
Community Size .87* 
(p<.001) 
3.53* 
(p<.001) 
Contribution 1.01* 
(p<.001) 
.92* 
(p<.001) 
Intercept 2.7* 
(p<.001) 
-4.5* 
(p<.002) 
R2 0.36 0.26 
Observations 2853 2745 
Table 4: Fixed effects regressions of earnings on 
movement  
 
Total Payoffs Congestible 
 
Pure 
 
   
Moves 45.3*     
(p<.001) 
-58.99*   
(p<.001)            
Contribution -11.14*  
(p=.358) 
-57.65*  
(p=.001) 
High Dummy 520* 
(p<.001) 
2657*  
(p<.001) 
Intercept 1048*  
(p<.001) 
2887*  
(p<.001) 
R2 0.49 0.81 
Observations 62 53 
Table 5: OLS regression of total profits on number of 
moves 
Table 5 shows the effect of movement on the subjects’ overall payoffs for the 
experiment. For both types, frequent movers tend to earn lower payoffs in the pure public good 
setting. While this effect is not significant for the Low Types, it is large and highly statistically 
significant for the High Types – in particular, a single additional move is associated with a lower 
payoff of 88 tokens – over triple their single period endowment and double their typical per-
period earnings. Conversely, frequent movement is associated with significantly higher total 
earnings for both types (significantly so) when the public good is congestible. Additionally, there 
is only a small, statistically-insignificant earnings advantage for those who “chase” rather than 
found and develop new communities, controlling for contributions. 
 
4.7. A Note on Subject Pool Differences 
 
 While all the subjects in the pure public good sessions were Caltech students, subjects 
were drawn from three different pools in the congestible public good sessions. The subjects in 
the first three congestion sessions were Caltech students; in the second two sessions they were 
Cambridge, MA area residents (including students and non-students); in the final two sessions, 
participation was restricted to Harvard University students. 
Across the CPG sessions, the public good contributions of Caltech students were the most 
responsive to differences in MPCR, followed by Harvard students, and the population that 
included non-students was the least responsive.17 All subjects in the PPG sessions were Caltech 
students and were no more responsive to differences in MPCR (which were primarily between-
subjects) than were the Cambridge populations in the CPG sessions.  
Due to the different subject pools and these noted differences in behavior, there is 
legitimate concern in comparing results from the congestible public good sessions conducted at 
both Harvard and Caltech to those from the pure public good sessions that were conducted 
entirely at Caltech, and attributing any differences solely to the rivalry of the public good. To 
address this concern, the PPG session results are also compared to the three Caltech-only CPG 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  These differences are all highly significant (p<.01). The Harvard student-only population is closer to the Caltech 
population if an extreme outlier judged not to be Harvard undergraduate is dropped from the sample. However, the 
difference is still significant (F=29.6 versus F=57 in Chow Test).  
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sessions. In every result concerning differences between pure public good and congestible public 
good environments presented in this paper, the differences are even more pronounced when only 
Caltech subjects are considered. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The pattern of those who impose negative externalities perpetually chasing those who 
impose positive externalities is a fundamental dynamic of community development and group 
formation.  
The poor chasing the rich – or the so-called “musical suburbs” problem – is an oft-
considered result in the Tiebout literature, though it is commonly subverted in practice by the 
implementation of zoning policies, which lead to uniform tax rates (Hamilton, 1975; Wilson, 
1998). Throughout U.S. history, the ubiquity of this concern may be seen in the restrictions 
placed on the mobility of the poor in federal legislation, ranging from the Articles of 
Confederation, which excluded “paupers” from those who had the right to move freely between 
states, to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996, which 
prevented newcomers from receiving welfare benefits beyond what they had been receiving 
previously for up to a year following their move (Donahue, 1997). 
Similarly, trendsetters are forever on the run from both conformists and marketers. Karni 
and Schmeidler (1990), for instance, show that social consumption preferences can lead to the 
cyclical nature of fads. This dynamic is borne out in the local neighborhoods of many cities, as 
artists enter and rejuvenate more affordable areas, only to attract further gentrification and 
eventually find themselves priced out of their new homes (Ley, 2003).  
Finally, the dynamic of chasing has also been observed in social dilemmas games, in 
which cooperators tend to be the first to exit uncooperative groups or partnerships and will be 
followed by free-riders and egoists in the absence of strict boundary rules (Ehrhart and Keser, 
1999; Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2008/2009). 
In this study, I find that this pattern persists in a population of agents with heterogeneous 
preferences for public good consumption, even when those responsible for the congestion 
receive little benefit from movement and locating near others, and when there are significant 
barriers to entry. Further, while sensitivity to congestion does drive a portion of the flight from 
crowded locations, the dynamic often persists in the absence of payoff congestion. Movement 
continues even after a strong Nash stable partition has been reached and forward-looking agents 
have no incentive to coordinate on another location. 
This suggests that this chasing dynamic is fundamental and intrinsic, rather than driven 
purely by congestion or payoff-based incentives. Even when efficiency would have a society 
pooling its resources into a single community, resentment or unwillingness to be around free-
riders suggests that achieving stable groups and communities may be dependent on requiring 
equal contributions from all members.  
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